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Abstract
It is known that the set of tautologies of second order intuitionistic
propositional logic, IPC2, is undecidable. Here, we prove that the sets
of formulas of IPC2 which are true in the algebra of open subsets of
reals or rationals are decidable.
1 Basic definitions
We investigate the second order intuitionistic propositional logic, denoted as
IPC2 (for a detailed treatment of this logic we refer to the book [SU]). The
set of formulas of this logic is the same as in the classical case. We have
standard propositional connectives, universal and existential quantifiers and
the set of propositions. Firstly, we present the set of axioms and rules in
the Gentzen style. Then, we define various semantics for IPC2 and describe
their status with respect to completeness and decidability of the tautology
problem.
Below, Γ is a multiset of formulas of IPC2, ψ, ϕ and ρ are formulas of
IPC2 and p is a proposition. The letters I and E in names of rules stand for
the “introduction” and “elimination”, respectively.
1. Axioms:
Γ, ψ ⊢ ψ.
∗Partially supported by MNiSW Grant N N206 355836
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2. Rules for conjunction:
Γ ⊢ ψ || Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ψ ∧ ϕ
(∧I),
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ
,
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
(∧E).
3. Rules for disjunction:
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
,
Γ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
(∨I),
Γ, ϕ ⊢ ρ || Γ, ψ ⊢ ρ || Γ ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ ρ
(∨E).
4. Rules for implication:
Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ
(⇒I),
Γ ⊢ ϕ⇒ ψ || Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ψ
(⇒E).
5. The rule ex falso quodlibet :
Γ ⊢ ⊥
Γ ⊢ ϕ
(⊥E).
6. Rules for quantifiers:
Γ ⊢ ϕ
Γ ⊢ ∀p ϕ
(∀I),
Γ ⊢ ∀p ϕ
Γ ⊢ ϕ[p := ψ]
(∀E),
Γ ⊢ ϕ[p := ψ]
Γ ⊢ ∃p ϕ
(∃I),
Γ ⊢ ∃p ϕ || Γ, ϕ ⊢ ψ
Γ ⊢ ψ
(∃E).
In rules (∀I) and (∃E) we have a restriction that the variable p should
not occur as a free variable of Γ or ψ
We denote the above calculus with IPC2 as well. Later, we consider sets of
tautologies of IPC2 for various kinds of algebraic semantics. However, these
sets will contain the set of theorems of the above calculus with one exception
of IPC2− (defined later). By IPC we denote intuitionistic propositional logic
(without quantification) and the corresponding calculus defined by removing
from the above one the rules for quantifiers.
In the above formulation we have no special rules and even no symbol
for negation. This is so, because we do not treat negation as a primitive but
rather we define ¬ϕ as ϕ⇒ ⊥. We define also ϕ⇔ ψ as (ϕ⇒ ψ)∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ).
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It is known that in the given calculus one can define from ∀ and ⇒ all other
connectives and quantifiers. So, the following formulas are provable,
⊥ ⇔ ∀p p
ϕ ∨ ψ ⇔ ∀p((ϕ⇒ p)⇒ ((ψ ⇒ p)⇒ p)),
ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ ∀p((ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇒ p))⇒ p),
∃qϕ(q)⇔ ∀p(∀q(ϕ(q)⇒ p)⇒ p).
In the proof of our main theorem we use this fact implicitly by restricting
our translation to formulas with ∀ and ⇒, only. Let us mention that we do
need ∀ quantifier to define other connectives, see e.g. [SU] or [SU10].
It was proved by Lo¨b (see [L76]) that the above calculus has an unde-
cidable provability problem. Even the ∀–free fragment of this logic is unde-
cidable (see [SU10]). Before Lo¨b’s article, Gabbay in [G74] considered IPC2
extended by a scheme called the axiom of constant domains (CD),
∀p(ϕ ∨ ψ(p))⇒ (ϕ ∨ ∀pψ(p)),
where p is not free in ϕ. In the context of first order intuitionistic logic
this scheme was introduced by Grzegorczyk in [G64] and it is also called
Grzegorczyk scheme (one should not confuse this with Grzegorczyk axiom
in modal logic). Gabbay showed undecidability of (IPC2 + CD), see [G74],
but his proof was later corrected by Sobolev in [S77]. Gabbay claimed that
his result generalizes to the case without CD. According to Gabbay, the
generalization could be obtained by the finite axiomatizability of CD over
IPC2. Nevertheless, it seems that there is no obvious method to define such
an axiomatization.
Sobolev also considered logics without full comprehension axioms which
correspond in our setting to rules ∀E and ∃I. In the restricted versions of
both rules we demand that the formula ψ is atomic. Let us call this logic
IPC2−. Sobolev showed then that any logic between IPC2− and (IPC2+CD)
is undecidable.
Now, we will discuss various semantics for IPC2. There are two kinds
of popular semantics for intuitionistic logics, one constructed using Kripke
models and the other one based on Heyting algebras. In the Kripkean ap-
proach semantics is given by Kripke frames (C,≤, {Dc : c ∈ C}), where each
Dc is a subset of P(C) and all X ∈ Dc are upward closed with respect to ≤.
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Moreover, for each c ≤ c′ ∈ C we have Dc ⊆ Dc′. The set C is the set of
possible worlds and, for each c ∈ C, the set Dc is the range of second order
quantification in the world c. Then, the value of a given formula ϕ as the
set of possible worlds at which ϕ is true may be given by a usual inductive
definition. In order to satisfy unrestricted versions of rules ∀E and ∃I one
needs to require that for any formula ϕ, any c ∈ C and for any valuation v of
propositions into Dc, if Xϕ,v is the set of worlds greater or equal c at which
ϕ is satisfied with v, then Xϕ,v ∈ Dc, for each c ∈ C. This class of models
gives a sound and complete semantics for IPC2. If we drop the last condition
concerning rules ∀E and ∃I then we get a sound and complete semantics
for IPC2−. The logics with CD are complete w.r.t. “constant domains se-
mantics” where all Dc’s are equal, see [G74]. Then, the range for quantifiers
is the same in all possible worlds. Let us stress that Dc’s may not contain
all upward closed subsets of C. Adding the condition that Dc’s contain all
upward closed subsets of C gives us the, so called, principal semantics. The
set of tautologies of principal Kripkean semantics is recursively isomorphic
to the classical second order logic as proved by Kremer, see [K97a].
Now, we turn to algebraic semantics. In the classical case the sound and
complete semantics for second order propositional logic is given by boolean
algebras. In the intuitionistic case the sound and complete semantics for IPC
is given by Heyting algebras.
A Heyting algebra (H,≤,∩,∪,→, 0, 1) is a distributive lattice with top
and bottom elements augmented with the pseudo-complement operation →
which interprets implication. It is required that the following is well defined
for a, b ∈ H ,
a→ b = max{c ∈ H : c ∩ a ≤ b}.
In the case of IPC, Heyting algebras give the sound and complete semantics,
e.g., by constructing a Heyting algebra from a Kripke model where all upward
closed sets from the Kripke model form the universe of the algebra.
In the algebraic semantics we have two ways in which we can interpret
quantification. In the, so called, principal semantics quantifiers range over
all elements of a given algebra and their meaning is given by infinite joins
and meets, which have to exist. In the non-principal semantics quantifiers
range over a distinguished subset of an algebra. In the second order case the
relation between Kripkean and algebraic semantics is not as straightforward
as in the quantifier free case. An obvious way to translate a Kripke frame
(C,≤, . . . ) into a special kind of Heyting algebra, a topology, would be to
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define a topology of all upward closed subsets of C. However, not all upward
closed subsets of a Kripke model are within its domain of quantification.
Moreover, for different possible worlds c ∈ C we may have different domains
Dc. Only if we consider principal Kripkean semantics then for a given frame
(C,≤, . . . ) we may define a topology of all upward closed subsets of C (see,
e.g., Exercise 2.8 in [SU]). For such topology the satisfaction relation is
preserved from the one of the Kripke frame.
Lately, Philip Kramer in a personal communication expressed his strong
confidence that the complexity of the set of tautologies for principal algebraic
semantics is as hard as in the case of principal Kripkean semantics. Kramer
made his statement in his article [K97b] (p. 296) claiming that a nontrivial
extension of methods from [K97a] would be needed. In a non-principal case
a recent article by Kramer, [K13], establishes its completeness w.r.t. IPC2.
A special case of Heyting algebras is given by topologies. Let us describe
a satisfiability relation for IPC2 and topological principal semantics. Let
T = (T,O(T )) be an arbitrary topology, where O(T ) is the set of open
subsets of T , and let v : PROP −→ O(T ) be a valuation from the set of
propositions. Then, we may define a value of a given formula of IPC2 in T
under v, denoted as JϕKTv , by recursion on the complexity of the formula:
1. J⊥KTv = 0,
2. JpKTv = v(p),
3. Jψ ∧ γKTv = JψK
T
v ∩ JγK
T
v ,
4. Jψ ∨ γKTv = JψK
T
v ∪ JγK
T
v ,
5. Jψ ⇒ γKTv = int((T \ JψK
T
v ) ∪ JγK
T
v ),
6. J∃pψKTv =
⋃
a∈O(T )JψK
T
v(p 7→a)),
7. J∀pψKTv = int(
⋂
a∈O(T)JψK
T
v(p7→a)).
We say that ϕ is true in T under v if JϕKTv = T .
It is known that the topologies of open subsets of R or Q form a sound
and complete semantics for IPC. It can be easily shown that it is not the case
for IPC2. Indeed, for each two r, r′ ∈ R there is a homeomorphism of R into
itself mapping r to r′. It follows that if we have a sentence ψ of IPC2 then
either JψKRv = R or JψK
R
v = ∅ (note that the value of JψK
R
v does not depend on
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v, for a sentence ψ). Therefore, for each sentence ψ of IPC2, ψ ∨ ¬ψ is true
in R. Of course, some sentences of that form are not provable in IPC2. One
can check that if we take an arbitrary quantifier free formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn)
which is a classical tautology and is not an intuitionistic tautology then for
ψ := ∀p1 . . .∀pnϕ, the formula ψ ∨ ¬ψ is not provable in IPC2. The very
same argument works also for Q.
On the other hand the sentence ¬∀p(p∨¬p) is true in R (and in Q) though
it is not valid intuitionistically and moreover it is a classical contrtautology. It
follows that the IPC2 theory of R or Q is not a subset of classical tautologies.
Despite the above facts, the topologies of the real and rational lines are
natural semantics for intuitionistic logics. Firstly, it is natural to ask about
second order propositional theory of these models which are kind of standard
models for IPC. Secondly, one can see IPC2 over R orQ as a language capable
of expressing some properties of these topologies. Thus, we may ask about
the decidability of topological theories of R or Q expressible in IPC2.
We show here, that IPC2 tautologies of principal semantics of reals or
rationals are easier than in the general case, namely decidable. The method
used in the proof is an interpretation of these theories into the monadic
theory of infinite binary tree, proved to be decidable by Rabin’s result (for
details on this subject we refer to [GWT02]).
Let T ω = {0, 1}∗ be the set of finite binary sequences. The infinite binary
tree is a structure T ω = (T ω, s0, s1,≤), where s0(u) = u0 and s1(u) = u1
and u ≤ v when u is an initial segment of v. A path in T ω is an infinite
set P ⊆ T ω such that P is closed on initial segments and is linearly ordered
by ≤. The empty sequence is denoted by ε.
The monadic second order logic is an extension of first order logic by
second order quantifiers ranging over subsets of a given universe. Rabin’s
theorem states that the monadic second order theory of T ω is decidable. We
will denote this theory by S2S. It should be noted that the complexity of
S2S is non-elementary. It became a standard method to show decidability of
various problems by reducing them to S2S. In the next section, we exhibit a
reduction for theories of IPC2 of reals and rationals.
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2 Decidability on R and Q
2.1 Interpretation in S2S
We give interpretations of IPC2 theories of O(R) and O(Q) in S2S. A similar
though a bit simpler interpretation was used in [Z04] showing decidability of
IPC2 (and S4 with propositional quantification) on trees of height and arity
≤ ω (in the principal semantics).
Theorem 1 The IPC2 theories of the open subsets of reals and the open
subsets of rational numbers are interpretable in S2S.
Proof. Let us recall that we write s0(x) and s1(x) to denote respectively
the left and the right successors, and x ≤ y to denote that x is on the path
from the root of the tree to y.
Firstly, we give an interpretation of the IPC2 theory of reals. Instead
of thinking about R we take an open interval (0, 1) which has the same
topological properties. In particular any topological operation is taken in
(0, 1), e.g., the closure of (0, 1/3) is (0, 1/3].
Each real number r ∈ (0, 1) may be seen as its binary representation
0.a0a1a2 . . . , where ai ∈ {0, 1} and r = Σ
∞
i=0ai2
−i−1. Such representations
can be interpreted as infinite paths in T ω. A binary sequence 0.a0a1a2 . . .
is therefore a path {ε, sa0(ε), sa1sa0(ε), . . . }. In what follows we will use
both representations: infinite {0, 1}–sequences a0a1a2 . . . (without the lead-
ing “0.”) and paths in T ω. In order to have the unique representation of
each real we exclude sequences which have only finitely many zeros.
We can define on such infinite paths in T ω the topology inherited from
(0, 1). What we need is to assure that formulas of IPC2 can be effectively
translated into formulas of S2S such that they will be equivalent modulo the
translation of open sets of both topologies.
An infinite binary path represents a real from (0, 1) if and only if it is not
of the form 0ω or u1ω for some u ∈ {0, 1}∗. The set of such paths is obviously
definable in S2S. A formula Path(X) stating that X is an infinite path is
just
(X(x) ∧X(y)⇒ (x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x))∧
∀x(X(x)⇒ (X(s0(x)) ∨X(s1(x)))) ∧X(ε).
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Then a formula U(X) defining the set of paths which represent some real
can be written as:
Path(X) ∧ ∀x
(
X(x)⇒ ∃z ≥ x X(s0(z))
)
∧ ∃xX(s1(x)).
The first conjunct of the above formula states that X is an infinite path,
the second one states that there are infinitely many 0’s in X and the third
conjunct states that there is at least one 1 in X . For a set X such that
Path(X), let r(X) be a real represented by X .
We need to represent not only real numbers but also subsets of (0, 1).
For a subset S ⊆ T ω, by R(S) we denote a set of reals such that their
corresponding paths are contained in S,
R(S) = {r(X) : U(X) ∧X ⊆ S} .
We will represent open subsets of (0, 1) by their closed complements. For
a set S ⊆ T ω, R(S) is closed in (0, 1) if the following formula, Closed(S),
holds:
∀X ⊆ S{[Path(X) ∧ ∃y(X(s0(y)) ∧ ∀z ≥ s0(y)¬X(s0(z))))]⇒
∃Y ⊆ S∃y[Path(Y ) ∧ Y (y) ∧X(y) ∧
X(s0(y)) ∧ ∀z ≥ s0(y)(X(z)⇒ X(s1(z))) ∧
Y (s1(y)) ∧ ∀z ≥ s1(y)(Y (z)⇒ Y (s0(z)))]}.
The formula above states that if a path X of the form u01ω is a subset of
S then there is a path Y ⊆ S of the form u10ω. The condition is necessary
because we do not allow paths of the form u1ω to represent reals (and satisfy
the predicate U(X)). Thus, if we have such a path X ⊆ S, then we require
that S contains also a path Y such that r(X) = r(Y ) and U(Y ). Otherwise,
it could happen that for some sequence of sets {Xi ⊆ S : i ∈ ω∧U(Xi)} such
that limi→∞ r(Xi) = r(X) (in fact all r(Xi) may be less than r(X)) there is
no Y ⊆ S such that U(Y ) and r(Y ) = r(X).
We use two facts about sets satisfying formula Closed(S).
Claim 2 1. For any C closed in (0, 1) there exists S ⊆ T ω such that
Closed(S) and R(S) = C.
2. For any S ⊆ T ω such that Closed(S), R(S) is closed in (0, 1).
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Proof. To show 1 it is enough to take S =
⋃
{X ⊆ T ω : U(X)∧r(X) ∈ C}.
Then, Closed(S) holds. Indeed, let a path u01ω be a subset of S, then there
is a sequence of reals ri ∈ C, for i ∈ ω such that ri = r(u01
ivi), for infinite
binary words vi where all paths u01
ivi are subsets of C. The sequence ri
converges to a real r(u10ω) and since C is closed r(u01ω) ∈ C and so u10ω
is a subset of S.
Obviously, C ⊆ R(S). To prove the converse let us assume that r =
r(X) ∈ R(S) for some X ⊆ R(S) such that U(X). Let us assume towards a
contradiction that r 6∈ C. We have two cases to consider. The first one when
X is of the form u10ω and the second, complementary case. We consider the
latter. Then, for each i ∈ ω there is ri ∈ C and Xi ⊆ S such that U(Xi),
ri = r(Xi) and X has a common initial segment with Xi of length i. This is
so because any element of S belongs to a path representing a real from C.
Now, r = limi→∞ ri and, since C is closed, r ∈ C, a contradiction. As for the
case of X = u10ω we repeat the same reasoning either with X or with a path
u01ω. In both cases we get the same contradiction r(X) = r(u01ω) ∈ C.
To show 2 let ri ∈ R(S) be a sequence of reals converging to some
r ∈ (0, 1). Let Pi ⊆ S be such that U(Pi) and ri = r(Pi) and let P ⊆ T
ω
be such that U(P ) and r = r(U). If Pi are of the form u01
nivi, for some
strictly increasing sequence ni, then P is a path u10
ω and, by Closed(S),
P ⊆ S. It follows that r ∈ R(S). Otherwise, P is a path with infinitely
many 1’s and r =
∑
i∈ω 2
−ni, for some strictly increasing sequence ni. Now,
if |r − ri| < 2
−ni−2 then P and Pi have a common initial segment of length
ni. We obtain that P ⊆
⋃
i∈ω Pi ⊆ S and, therefore, r ∈ R(S). 
The above claim shows that sets of the form Closed(S) are a good repre-
sentation of closed subsets of (0, 1). We can write an S2S formula clBelong(X,S)
expressing that a real r(X) belongs to a closed set R(S). It has the form
U(X) ∧ Closed(S) ∧X ⊆ S.
Similarly, we can express that a closed set R(S) is included in a set R(T )
with
∀X(clBelong(X,S)⇒ clBelong(X, T )).
Let us state a useful lemma about definability in S2S.
Lemma 3 For each S2S formula ϕ(X) with X a free second order variable
and possibly with some first and second order parameters there exists a for-
mula minϕ(X) such that
9
• if there exists a unique minimal closed set C ⊆ (0, 1) such that ϕ(X) is
true for any X with C = R(X), then minϕ(X) is true only about sets
X satisfying C = R(X),
• minϕ(X) if false for any set X, otherwise.
Proof. We write a formula minϕ(X) as
ϕ(X) ∧ Closed(X)∧
∀Y ((Closed(Y )∧ϕ(Y ))⇒ ∀Z((U(Z)∧clBelong(Z,X))⇒ clBelong(Z, Y ))).

Now,we define an inductive translation of an IPC2 formula ϕ(p1, . . . , pn)
into an S2S formula ϕ∗(T, T1, . . . , Tn). We represent open sets by its closed
complements. We require the following property: for all open subsets R,R1, . . . , Rn
of (0, 1) and all X,X1, . . . , Xn ⊆ T
ω such that Closed(X), R = (0, 1) \R(X)
and Closed(Xi), Ri = (0, 1) \R(Xi), for i ≤ n, we have the equivalence,
[ϕ]
(0,1)
{pi 7→Ri}
= R if and only if
({0, 1}∗ , s0, s1,≤) |= ϕ
∗[X,X1, . . . , Xn].
If ϕ = ⊥, then ϕ∗ = ∀xT (x) (note that if X = T ω then R(X) = (0, 1)
and we want the complement of X to be the empty set). If ϕ = pi, then
ϕ∗ = ∀Y (U(Y )⇒ (clBelong(Y, T )⇔ clBelong(Y, Ti))).
For ϕ = (ψ1 ⇒ ψ2), we have
[ϕ](0,1)v = int
(
((0, 1) \ [ψ1]
(0,1)
v ) ∪ [ψ2]
(0,1)
v
)
= max{O ⊆ (0, 1) : O is open ∧O ⊆ ((0, 1) \ [ψ1]
(0,1)
v ) ∪ [ψ2]
(0,1)
v }
= (0, 1) \min{C ⊆ (0, 1) : C is closed ∧
([ψ1]
(0,1)
v ∩ ((0, 1) \ [ψ2]
(0,1)
v )) ⊆ C}.
By properties of the topology the above maximum and minimum exist.
We need to write a formula ψ∗(T, T1, . . . , Tn) such that with parameters
X1, . . . , Xn substituted for T1, . . . , Tn, respectively, it will be true only about
the unique T with
R(T ) = C0 = min{C ⊆ (0, 1) : C is closed ∧([ψ1]
(0,1)
v ∩((0, 1)\[ψ2]
(0,1)
v )) ⊆ C}.
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Let ϕ̂(T, T1, . . . , Tn) be a formula
Closed(T ) ∧ ψ∗1(T
∗
1 , T1, . . . , Tn) ∧ ψ
∗
2(T
∗
2 , T1, . . . , Tn)∧
∀X((U(X) ∧ ¬clBelong(X, T ∗1 ) ∧ clBelong(X, T
∗
2 ))⇒ clBelong(X, T )).
The formula above expresses the definitional property of C0 in S2S and the
topology of T ω inherited from (0, 1). Now, as ϕ∗(T, T1, . . . , Tn) we take the
formula minϕ̂(T,... )(T, T1, . . . , Tn) from Lemma 3 where the minimum is taken
over T . The formula ϕ∗(T, . . . ) is true only about the set C0 what proves the
inductive thesis for ϕ.
If ϕ = ∀pnψ(pn) then
[ϕ](0,1)v = int(
⋂
O is open
[ψ]
(0,1)
v(p7→O))
= max{S ⊆ (0, 1) : S is open and for all open O ⊆ (0, 1), S ⊆ [ψ]
(0,1)
v(p 7→O)}
= (0, 1) \min{C ⊆ (0, 1) : C is closed and
for all open O ⊆ (0, 1), (0, 1) \ [ψ]
(0,1)
v(p 7→O) ⊆ C}.
Since any topology is a complete Heyting algebras, the above sets are well
defined. The last expression can be translated to an S2S formula. Let ϕ̂(T )
be the following formula
Closed(T )∧
∀W∀Tn[(Closed(W ) ∧ Closed(Tn) ∧ ψ
∗(W,T1, . . . , Tn))⇒
∀Y ((U(Y ) ∧ clBelong(Y,W ))⇒ clBelong(Y, T ))].
Now, using Lemma 3, we can write ϕ∗(T ) as minϕ̂(T )(T, T1, . . . , Tn−1).
The above translation gives us decidability of IPC2 on (0, 1) since for any
IPC2 sentence ϕ,
ϕ is true in (0, 1) if and only if
∀T∀X((Closed(T ) ∧ ϕ∗(T ) ∧ U(X))⇒ ¬clBelong(X, T )) is true in T ω.
A similar procedure gives also decidability of the IPC2 theory of open
subsets of rationals. One needs to use the fact that the topology of dyadic
rationals from (0, 1) is isomorphic to the topology of Q. Then, the set of
paths which correspond to these rationals is easily definable as paths of the
form u10ω, for some u ∈ {0, 1}∗. Now, let UQ(X) be a formula which defines
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these paths. In order to obtain an interpretation of the IPC2 theory of open
subsets of rationals one should restrict the universe of the given above inter-
pretation to infinite paths satisfying UQ. Syntactically, one should replace
each occurrence of U(X) with UQ(X). 
The above reduction gives a non elementary upper bound on the com-
plexity of IPC2 on reals or rationals. We conjecture that the complexity of
these theories is in fact elementary.
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Pawe l Urzyczyn for urging me
to write this paper.
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